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Comments
I Want a Piece of That! How the Current




After observing a new invention, have you ever muttered to
yourself, "Why didn't I think of that?" Before criticizing your own lack
of individual creativity, you should keep in mind that the invention was
likely conceived through the collaborative work efforts of many
inventors assigned to a research and development (R&D) team. R&D
teams drive large companies, a fact which indicates, in part, the
tremendous value of collaboration on the path to innovation.' Depending
upon a company's business goals, an invention's commercial value, and
the potential for a competitive advantage, among other factors, a
company may protect its R&D investments by seeking patents on the
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, May 2011.
1. See Justin Scheck & Paul Glader, R&D Spending Holds Steady in Slump, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at Al (reporting that "big U.S. companies spent nearly as much on
research and development in the dismal last quarter of 2008 as they did a year earlier,
even as their revenue fell 7.7%").
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innovations of its inventors from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).2 Inevitably, not all individual contributions to the joint
development of an invention will be equal in quality or quantity. The
disparity in contributions is especially troublesome when determining
who must be designated as an inventor of a particular invention, a
determination with lasting implications on many parties.3
An application for a patent must be filed at the PTO in the name of
the inventor or joint inventors of the invention.4 This requirement
supports the commonsense notion that only the actual inventor(s) of an
invention are entitled to a patent.' In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) opined:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented. We have stated that
"since the word 'he' refers to the specific inventive entity named on
the patent, this subsection mandates that a patent accurately list the
correct inventors of the claimed invention."
When an invention is initially conceived, patent ownership vests in the
named inventor(s) who conceived and reduced the invention to practice.7
"The patent is then assignable by an instrument in writing, and the
assignment ... transfers to the assignee(s) an alienable ownership
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2010) (authorizing the United States Patent and Trademark
Office to grant and issue patents, as well as to disseminate to the public information with
respect to patents). A patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
3. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa.
1972) ("The exact parameters of what constitutes joint inventorship are quite difficult to
define. It is one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law.").
4. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2010). The famous provision of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). Under
limited circumstances, a person other than an inventor may file an application for patent.
See 35 U.S.C. § 118 (2010). The United States places a greater emphasis on individuals
than most foreign jurisdictions by requiring that a patent application be filed in the name
of the inventor(s). In Europe, for example, a patent application may be filed "by any
natural or legal person, or any body equivalent to a legal person by virtue of the law
governing it." European Patent Convention, art. 58 (1973).
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2010).
6. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. All-Tag Sec. S.A., 412 F.3d 1331, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citations omitted). Inventorship errors occur in the form of misjoinder,
nonjoinder, or a combination thereof. DONALD S. CHIsUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.03
(2009). Misjoinder occurs when an inventor is named in error. Id. Nonjoinder occurs
when a true inventor is not named. Id.
7. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 301 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990
F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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interest in the patent. .. ." Although a company may employ a team of
inventors and may own the patent after assignment, it has no legal claim
to inventorship.9 Rather, only natural persons may be inventors.o
With the ease of modem communication, the ability to share ideas is
beyond what the early patent system anticipated; the inventorship statute
prior to the 1984 amendments failed to include any guidance as to who
would qualify as a joint inventor when two or more persons contributed
to an invention." In 1984, Congress amended the statute in an attempt to
account for joint work efforts, yet, even today, it lacks a qualitative or
quantitative guideline regarding the type of inventive contribution
required to qualify as a joint inventor.12
A highly unlikely but helpful hypothetical scenario for the purpose
of this study is referred to as "The Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem."' 3
Imagine that you are finalizing your ideas for an incredible new car when
your friend suggests that the car include a new and inventive fuzzy
steering wheel. You decide that you like the idea and eventually
incorporate the fuzzy steering wheel into the claims of your patent on the
car. Must your friend be considered a joint inventor for such a minute
contribution? This is an extreme scenario, but it illuminates a serious
issue in patent law affecting many interested parties. Researchers,
scientists, and engineers, for example, seek the reward and recognition of
being named an inventor on a patent. At the same time, patent attorneys
must communicate with inventive teams to determine the correct
inventors when seeking patents. Ultimately, patent owners must ensure
both the validity of its patents and its ability to sue for patent
infringement.
As collaborative work efforts increase, it is difficult to distinguish a
contribution worthy of legal inventorship status from an input that, while
useful, does not surpass the blurry threshold of inventive contribution.
This Comment utilizes the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem to analyze:
(1) how and what one must contribute to an invention to be named a joint
inventor, (2) whether the joint inventorship rules are sufficiently clear,
and (3) whether the rules promote the underlying policies of the patent
laws. Part II discusses the significance of inventorship in patent law
8. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261).
9. See Beech Aircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248.
10. See id.
I. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1982).
12. See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[35
U.S.C. § 116] sets no explicit lower limit on the quantum or quality of inventive
contribution required for a person to qualify as a joint inventor.").
13. Email from Joshua Auriemma, Admissions Editor, Penn State Law Review, to
author, Associate Editor, Penn State Law Review (Aug. 28, 2009, 8:51 EST) (suggesting
the "Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem") (on file with author).
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focusing on how inventorship impacts interested parties. Part III
presents the relevant statutory provisions of the Patent Act including the
effects of the 1984 amendments. Part IV defines the current law on joint
inventorship, specifically, the rules governing inventorship qualification
enforced by the Federal Circuit. Part V analyzes the Fuzzy Steering
Wheel Problem through an application of the current joint inventorship
laws presented in Part IV. Part VI discusses the timeline of the
development process and its effect on the joint inventorship analysis.
Finally, Part VII analyzes the suitability and clarity of the current joint
inventorship laws.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INVENTORSHIP
A. The Patent Grant
A patent confers a property right to inventors, allowing them to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing the patented invention in the United States. 14  Congress
recognized that this right should be granted only to a true inventor who
was the first individual to invent the claimed subject matter.15  The
property right rewards innovation, thus encouraging the research and
development of new technologies.16 In exchange for an inventor or
inventors gaining a monopolistic property right, the public benefits from
the full disclosure of the patented invention;' 7 an inventor is required by
law to include in an application for patent a written description of the
invention, the manner and process of making and using it, and the best
mode contemplated by the inventor for carrying out the invention.
Ultimately, the public benefits from: (1) the introduction of patented
products and processes into society and (2) the full disclosure of a
patented invention because the knowledge will stimulate innovation
leading to the development of significant improvements.19 As a matter
of policy, awarding a patent to a person or persons other than the true
inventor(s) undermines the quid pro quo between inventors and the
public. Furthermore, it would deteriorate the public's confidence in and
perception of the patent system. Beyond such policy argument, why
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2010).
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2010).
16. See A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
17. See id. at 563 ("The quid pro quo which supports the patent grant is the
requirement of a full disclosure regarding the invention.").
18. 35U.S.C.§ 112 (2010).
19. See A.F. Stoddard, 564 F.2d at 563-64 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
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must a clear and workable standard exist to determine who qualifies as a
joint inventor? The answer, in one word, is ownership.
B. The Relationship Between Inventorship and Ownership
An inventor of at least one claim in a patent gains ownership over
the entire patent.2 0 This principle stems from the 1984 amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 116, which reduced the bar for obtaining joint inventorship
status by implying that a person need only contribute to one patent claim
to qualify as a joint inventor.21 Congress believed that the amendment
"recognize[d] the realities of modem team research."2 2 No change in
patent ownership laws led to the interpretation that an inventor who
contributed to one patent claim gains ownership in the entire patent. The
inequity of permitting equal ownership interests for unequal
contributions is the foundation of controversy in joint
inventorship/ownership law and enhances the significance of
distinguishing true inventive contributions from non-qualifying efforts. 2 3
While inventorship and ownership remain distinct issues of patent
law, primarily because contractual arrangements and assignments dictate
ownership throughout the life of a patent, the two issues are inevitably
intertwined in that patent ownership always begins with inventorship.24
Assuming that none of the inventors listed on a patent have assigned
their ownership rights to another party, each inventor may make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States
without the consent of and without accounting to the other inventors.2 5
This arrangement can put joint inventors in adverse positions relative to
20. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also Israel Bio-Eng'g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("When ... multiple inventors are listed on the face of the patent, each co-owner
'presumptively owns a pro rata undivided interest in the entire patent, no matter what
their respective contributions."') (quoting Ethicon, Inc. v. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456,
1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2010) ("Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even
though . . . each did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the
patent.").
22. 130 CONG. REc. 28,073 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
23. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466 ("A joint inventor as to even one claim enjoys a
presumption of ownership in the entire patent."). But see id., 135 F.3d at 1469-72
(Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116 "did not
automatically convey ownership of the entire patent to everyone who could now be
named as an inventor, whatever the contribution").
24. See Israel, 475 F.3d at 1263 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990
F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is elementary that inventorship and ownership are
separate issues.")); see also supra note 7.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2010). For a thorough discussion of the rights of co-owners,
see In re Diomed Inc., 394 B.R. 260, 266-67 (D. Mass. 2008).
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each other and "at the mercy" of their fellow joint inventors.26 For
example, a joint-inventor, as a co-owner, may grant a license to a third
party enabling the third party to use the patented invention without the
consent of other co-owners. 27 The court in Schering Corp. v. Roussel-
UCLA F SA2 8 opined:
[U]nless the co-owner has given up [its] rights through an "agreement
to the contrary,"29 the co-owner may not be prohibited from
exploiting its rights in the patent, including the right to grant licenses
to third parties on whatever conditions the co-owner chooses. 30
An exercise of this right by a co-owner can cripple a patent infringement
suit. In Schering, for example, the court held that the potential infringer
did not infringe a patent because a co-owner had granted a license
permitting the potential infringer to use the patented invention.31
Furthermore, co-owners usually must consent to join as plaintiffs in
an infringement suit. 32  Consequently, "one co-owner has the right to
impede the other co-owner's ability to sue infringers by refusing to
voluntarily join in such a suit."3 3 For instance, in Israel Bio-Engineering
Project v. Amgen, Inc.,34 the court found that the patent owner, who filed
suit alleging patent infringement, was not the sole owner of a particular
26. Willingham v. Star Cutter Co., 555 F.2d 1340, 1344 (6th Cir. 1977) ("Co-owners
of a patent have interests which are essentially distinct and separate. The nature of a
patent is such that co-owners are at the mercy of each other."); see In re Diomed Inc., 394
B.R. at 266 ("With co-ownership comes the power to use the patent in its entirety, even if
the circumstances suggest that the use results in the abuse of the rights of the remaining
co-owners."); see also, e.g., Tavory v. NTP, Inc., No. 2007-1527, 2008 WL 4710761
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2008) (holding that unjust enrichment claim brought by a co-owner of
a patent against another co-owner when the latter transferred his own interest to a third
party was preempted by § 262, which provides that a patent co-owner may transfer his
own interest in a patent without the consent of, and without any accounting to, the other
co-owners).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2010).
28. Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2010).
30. Schering Corp., 104 F.3d at 344.
31. See id. at 342.
32. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
33. Id. (quoting Schering Corp., 104 F.3d at 345). In Ethicon, a co-owner's refusal
to join as plaintiff in a patent infringement suit required dismissal of the suit for lack of
standing. Id. There are two established exceptions to this general principle: (1) if a
patent owner has granted an exclusive license, he stands in a relationship of trust to his
licensee and must permit the licensee to sue in his name; and (2) if, by agreement, a co-
owner waives his right to refuse to join suit, then his co-owners may force him to join a
suit against an infringer. Id. But see Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142
F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (analyzing whether a claim may proceed in the absence
of a patent owner under the four factor test of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
34. Israel Bio-Eng'g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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patent.3 1 In applying the rule that a joint owner must join all other co-
owners in a patent infringement suit to establish standing, the court
dismissed the suit for lack of the voluntary joinder of the other owner.3 6
The valuable rights at stake due to the relationship between inventorship
and ownership demonstrate the necessity of effective rules to determine
who will acquire these rights when multiple people, rather than a single
inventor, contribute to the development of an invention.
While patent ownership initially vests in the named inventors,3 7
38 i h
ownership rights are often assigned to a company. As noted in the
introduction, large companies are driven by R&D teams that continue to
produce new technologies.3 9 Most frequently, employed joint inventors
assign their ownership interests to their employer corporations, often
under a contractual obligation to do so.4 0 Even if a company owns a
patent, it does not escape the serious implications of inventorship. For
example, a company may believe it exclusively owns a patent after
assignment from the listed inventors, but in the event of a mistake where
a true inventor went unnamed, the unnamed individual deserves
ownership rights and can gain those rights upon the appropriate showing
41
of evidence in court. Consequently, a company's patent infringement
suit may be undermined if an unnamed inventor, as an owner, refuses to
join in the suit, or the unnamed inventor licenses the potential infringer
42to use the patented invention.
Given the effects that misjoinder and nonjoinder of inventors have
on many interested parties, inventorship has been the chief subject of
much litigation.4 3 "Ultimately, ownership stems from inventorship. If
35. See id. at 1268.
36. See id.
37. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 7.
38. See CHISUM, supra note 6, § 22.01.
39. See Scheck & Glader, supra note 1.
40. See CHISUM, supra note 38.
Generally, an invention is the property of the inventor who conceived,
developed, and perfected it. Hence, the mere fact that the inventor was
employed by another at the time of the invention does not mean that that
inventor is required to assign the patent rights to the employer. The right, if
any, of an employer to inventions of its employee is determined primarily by
the contract of employment.
Scott System, Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775, 778 (Colo. App. 2000).
41. Univ. of Pitt. v. Hedrick, 573 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The inventors
named in an issued patent are presumed correct, and a party alleging misjoinder [or
nonjoinder] of inventors must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.").
42. See Lucent Techs, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 342 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
43. See generally, e.g., Univ. of Pitt., 573 F.3d at 1290 (deciding whether
independent researchers were inappropriately named as joint inventors alongside
researchers for the University of Pittsburgh); Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558
F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (determining the inventorship status of an alleged inventor
4552010]
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inventorship is wrong, the entire chain of title, as well as the agreements
based upon it, [is] tainted."44
C. The Risk of Invalidity
Perhaps a more serious consequence of an inventorship mistake is
the risk of the patent being declared invalid. Prior to the enactment of
the Patent Act of 1952, a mistake of inventorship invalidated the patent.45
Once enacted, however, 35 U.S.C. § 256 allows a mistake of
inventorship to be corrected without affecting the enforceability of the
46issued patent so long as the error arose without any deceptive intention.
Based on the plain meaning of the statute, an issued patent will rarely be
invalidated for inventorship errors unless a party can prove that the
patentee had intent to deceive, which is otherwise known as carrying out
inequitable conduct.47 Despite the fact that inventorship mistakes are
correctable,48 it still takes valuable time and money to correct them.4 9
who was not joined in an infringement suit); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135
F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (deciding whether a defendant-intervenor, claiming to have
granted defendant a retroactive license, was a true joint inventor, thus having the power
to grant the license).
44. DONALD A. DEGNAN & LIBBY A. HUSKEY, INVENTORSHIP: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
You DON'T GET IT RIGHT? (Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n. 2006).
45. See Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Well-
established case law predating the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 . . . mandated that
nonjoinder of an actual inventor would render a patent invalid.").
46. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2010). See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. All-Tag Sec. S.A.,
412 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("'If nonjoinder of an actual inventor is proved by
clear and convincing evidence, a patent is rendered invalid.' However, '[i]f a patentee
can demonstrate that inventorship can be corrected as provided by [statute], a district
court must order correction of the patent, thus saving it from being rendered invalid."')
(quoting Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
47. See Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817,
829 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("A party asserting inequitable conduct must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that a patent applicant breached [its duty of candor, good faith, and
honesty] by (1) 'fail[ing] to disclose material information or submit[ting] materially false
information to the PTO' with (2) 'intent to mislead or deceive the examiner."') (quoting
McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
In Rome Fastener, a patent infringement suit was dismissed because the patent was
declared unenforceable based on inequitable conduct. See id. at 829-32. The court
determined that the only listed inventor "concealed the most critical information: he was
not the inventor he claimed to be." Id. at 830.
48. Inventorship errors in patent applications may be corrected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 116, whereas inventorship errors in issued patents may be corrected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 256.
49. The PTO requires any request to correct inventorship of an issued patent to be
accompanied by: (1) a statement from each person who is being added as an inventor that
the error occurred without any deceptive intent; (2) a statement from the current named
inventors either agreeing to the change or stating that they have no disagreement; (3) a
statement from all assignees agreeing with the change; and (4) a processing fee. 37
C.F.R. § 1.324 (2009).
456 [Vol. 115:2
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III. THE PATENT ACT AND THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
After examining the significance of inventorship, it is beneficial to
understand the development of the law of joint invention in the Patent
Act. The property right in a patented invention is defined by the breadth
of the patent claims; thus, only the claims are important when
determining inventorship.so Prior to the 1984 amendments, Congress
provided minimal guidance as to who constituted a joint inventor and
instead only described the procedures for jointly applying for a patent
and for correcting inadvertent inventorship mistakes in patent
applications.5 1  During that time, courts developed an "all claims" rule
for addressing the joint inventorship issue.52  "The 'all claims' rule
required, in a joint patent, each inventor to contribute to the subject
matter of each claim."53 For example, if two inventors jointly developed
a single, patentable invention, but the inventors individually contributed
to separate claims of the patent, the "all claims" rule required each
collaborative inventor to file a separate patent application containing
only the claims contributed to by the corresponding inventor. 54 In 1998,
Judge Pauline Newman discussed why the "all claims" rule was
problematic:
If different persons made an inventive contribution to various parts of
an invention or to different claims of a patent, the legalistic problems
50. See DONALD S. CHIsUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.02 (2009) ("[A]n inventorship
analysis, like an infringement or invalidity analysis, begins as a first step with a
construction of each asserted claim to determine the subject matter encompassed thereby.
The second step is then to compare the alleged contributions of each asserted co-inventor
with the subject matter of the properly construed claim to then determine whether the
correct inventors were named.") (quoting Trovan v. Sokymat SA, Irori, 299 F.3d 1292,
1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
51. Prior to the 1984 amendments, 35 U.S.C. § 116 read as follows:
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for
patent jointly and each sign the application and make the required oath, except
as otherwise provided in this title. . . . If a joint inventor refuses to join in an
application for patent or cannot be found or reached after diligent effort, the
application may be made by the other inventor on behalf of himself and the
omitted inventor .... Whenever through error a person is named in an
application for patent as the inventor, or through error an inventor is not named
in an application, and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his
part, the Commissioner may permit the application to be amended accordingly,
under such terms as he prescribes.
35 U.S.C. § 116 (1982).
52. See AMP, Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelec., Inc., 853 F.Supp. 808, 817 (M.D. Pa.
1994).
53. Id.
54. See Worden v. Fisher, II F. 505, 508-09 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1882) ("If one person
invents a distinct part of a machine, and another person invents another distinct and
independent part of the same machine, then each should obtain a patent for his own
invention.").
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that arose were not readily soluble, even by the complex, expensive,
and often confusing expedient of filing separate patent applications
on separate claims.... As team research increased with the growth
of technology-based industry, so did the dilemma, for the rules of
joint inventorship were not readily adaptable to the development of
complex inventions. It became apparent that legislative remedy was
needed.55
In 1984, Congress tried to account for the technical problems
stemming from the increase in collaborative work efforts by enacting an
amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116. The amendment states:
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall
apply for patent jointly and each make the required oath, except as
otherwise provided in this title. Inventors may apply for a patent
jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the
same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of
contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to the subject
matter of every claim of the patent. 56
On its face, the amendment rejected the "all claims" rule.57 In
interpreting the statute, courts have stated that an inventor's contribution
to one claim is enough to qualify as a joint inventor. The amended
statute, while providing more guidance, only addresses what is not
required for joint-invention. Joint-inventors do not have to:
(1) physically work together or at the same time; (2) make equal
contributions in type or amount; or (3) contribute to every claim.59 The
statute, however, does not define what kind of qualitative or quantitative
contribution is legally sufficient to qualify as a joint inventor. In
addition, the statute does not discuss whether the point in the
development process at which a potential inventor gives his or her input
is important to the inventorship analysis.
55. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (also recognizing that patents were invalidated simply because
all the named inventors did not contribute to all the claims) (citing Jamesbury Corp. v.
U.S., 518 F.2d 1384, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1975)).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 116, para. 1 (1984).
57. See Fujitsu Microelec., Inc., 853 F. Supp. at 817.
58. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 ("A co-inventor need not make a contribution to
every claim of a patent. A contribution to one claim is enough.") (citing SmithKline
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
59 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2010).
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IV. DEFINING JOINT INVENTORSHIP
A. Conception
Without affirmative congressional guidelines, courts, namely the
Federal Circuit, have assumed the responsibility of defining the
appropriate standards for joint inventorship. A long line of decisions
from the Federal Circuit has held that a person must contribute to the
conception of the claimed invention to qualify as a joint inventor.o In
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 61 the Federal Circuit
explained that "[c]onception is the touchstone of inventorship, the
completion of the mental part of the invention."62
In essence, joint inventorship determinations require a layered
analysis of crucial terms. To begin, conception has been defined as the
"formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea
of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in
practice. An important observation that does not follow intuitively
from the previous definition is that an individual joint inventor need not
have a "definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative
invention" so long as all of the joint inventors collectively satisfy that
requirement." As a whole, "the conceived invention must include every
feature of the subject matter claimed in the patent."65
If a joint inventor must contribute to a "definite and permanent
idea" in order to have contributed to the "conception" of the invention, it
is imperative to determine, first, the definition of definite and permanent
60. Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp., 601 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A joint
inventor's own statements are inadequate to prove conception as a matter of law. See
Tavory v. NTP, Inc., No. 2007-1527, 2008 WL 4710761 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 27, 2008)
(explaining that a co-inventor's own statements must be corroborated by independent
evidence, which can be in the form of contemporaneous documents or the oral testimony
of an independent witness).
61. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 1227-28.
63. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (quoting I ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)).
64 See Vanderbilt Univ., 601 F.3d at 1303 ("[E]ach contributor need not have their
own contemporaneous picture of the final claimed invention in order to qualify as joint
inventors.") (citing Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("One need not alone conceive of the entire invention, for this would obviate the concept
ofjoint invention.").
65. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In a joint invention, each
inventor must contribute to the joint arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the
invention as it will be used in practice. See Univ. of Pitt. v. Hedrick, 573 F.3d 1290,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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and, second, when the formation of such idea is complete, because one
will not qualify as a joint inventor by "merely assisting the actual
inventor after conception of the claimed invention." 66  "An idea is
definite and permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a
particular solution to the problem at hand."67 An inventor, however,
need not know that the invention will work in practice for conception to
be complete.68 "Proof that the invention works to a scientific certainty is
[the separate step of] reduction to practice., 6 9  Rather, conception is
complete when "only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the
invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation."70
Consequently, the sophistication of the science underlying the invention,
which influences factors such as the level of ordinary skill and required
experimentation, may substantially impact whether conception is
complete.7 1 At the point where only ordinary skill is necessary to reduce
the invention to practice, in essence the completion of conception, an
66 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
67. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228.
68. Hedrick, 573 F.3d at 1298 (citing Price, 988 F.2d at 1196).
69. Id. at 1299. An insightful passage from Hedrick concerning joint inventorship of
an adipose tissue-derived stem cell, illuminates the priority of conception over reduction
to practice in resolving inventorship disputes:
[Blecause the district court found evidence that Katz and Llull had formed a
definite and permanent idea of the cells' inventive qualities, and had in fact
observed them, it is immaterial that their knowledge was not scientifically
certain and that the REBAR researchers helped them gain such scientific
certainty. "The determinative inquiry is not whether [the inventor's] disclosure
was phrased certainly or tentatively, but whether the idea expressed therein was
sufficiently developed to support conception of the subject matter."
Id. (quoting In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
70. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228. It is said that an invention consists of two parts:
conception and reduction to practice. Judkins v. HT Windows Fashions Corp., 624 F.
Supp. 2d 427, 435 (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d
1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Conception is the mental formation of a definite and
permanent idea. See id. Reduction to practice is generally regarded as taking an
intangible idea and reducing it to a physical, working embodiment, known as actual
reduction to practice. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed.
Cir. 2006). Reduction to practice also occurs upon the filing of a patent application,
which discloses the invention in such detail as to be considered "constructively" reduced
to practice. See Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Hyatt v.
Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
71. See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473-74 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(discussing the doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice, which
states that in some instances, an inventor may only be able to establish a conception by a
reduction to practice through a successful experiment). The doctrine applies primarily to
experimental sciences involving complex chemical compounds under the rationale that an
inventor cannot conceive, which involves possessing an operative method of producing
the compound, until the idea has been reduced to practice through a successful
experiment. See Brown v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 866 F. Supp. 439, 442-43 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
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inventor's idea is clearly and particularly defined and is not just a
"general goal or research plan." 72
B. Inventiveness
As previously discussed, a joint inventor need not contribute to the
conception of every claim, nor make the same "type or amount" of
contribution as other inventors. Nevertheless, certain efforts, even if
contributing to a definite and permanent idea, will be insufficient. A
widely cited case states that an individual must have played an
"inventive" role in making an "original contribution" to a "final solution"
in order to qualify as a joint inventor.74 Therefore, exercising "normal
skill expected of one skilled in the art, without an inventive act" will not
qualify one as a joint inventor. Accordingly, a person who merely
provides the inventor with well-known principles or explains the current
state of the art will not be considered a joint inventor.76 Similarly,
simply exercising ordinary skill to reduce the invention to practice is
insufficient for joint inventorship.n Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, Inc.78 provides an insightful example of a person who exercised
only ordinary skill in the art when contributing to an invention and
therefore did not qualify as a joint inventor. In Hess, two doctors
invented a balloon angioplasty catheter, but the doctors could not find an
appropriate material for the balloon.7 9 The doctors sought advice from
Mr. Hess, an engineer, who recommended the doctors use a specific
material for the balloon in their invention, for which they subsequently
obtained a patent.s0 Mr. Hess challenged that he should be considered a
joint inventor for his contribution.8 1 In denying Mr. Hess's claim of
72. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228.
73. 35U.S.C.§ 116(2010).
74. Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 442 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818,
824 (D.D.C. 1967)).
75 Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ewen, 123 F.3d at 1473).
76. See id. at 1356; Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 1358, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
77 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460 (citing Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 416 (Fed. Cir.
1994)). But see Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("All that is
required of a joint inventor is that he or she [] contributes in some significant manner to
the conception or reduction to practice of the invention .... "). In Pannu, it is unclear
why the Federal Circuit suggests that a significant contribution to the reduction to
practice of the invention will qualify one as a joint inventor. Past precedent typically
construes reduction to practice as a separate step following conception.
78. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
79. See id. at 977.
80 See id.
81. See id at 978.
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inventorship, the court explained that Mr. Hess did no more than
contribute well-known principles that a person of ordinary skill in the art
could add.82 Specifically, the court noted that the principles Mr. Hess
explained to the doctors "were well known and found in textbooks" and
that Mr. Hess "did no more than a skilled salesman would do in
explaining how his employer's product could be used to meet a
customer's requirements."83 The court's reasoning plainly emphasized
the lack of inventiveness of Mr. Hess's contribution.
C. The "Not Insignificant in Quality " Requirement
In addition to being inventive, a contribution to conception worthy
of inventorship must be "not insignificant in quality" when compared to
the dimension of the full invention.8 4 This principle dictated the outcome
in Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc.,85 a recent decision by the
Federal Circuit. In that case, Nartron Corp. sued Borg Indak, Inc. for
contributory infringement of its patent relating to a vehicle seat control
system that provides massage capability.86 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the suit because of
Nartron's failure to join an alleged joint inventor, Benson, as a plaintiff.87
Nartron appealed the district court's decision, arguing that Benson was
not a true inventor. Benson's alleged inventive contribution was an
extender for a lumbar support adjustor that extended outwardly from the
seat back toward a spinal curvature of an occupant.8 9 In rejecting Benson
as a joint inventor, the Federal Circuit declared that his contribution was
nothing but an exercise of ordinary skill in the art and noted that such
extenders were already part of existing automobile seats. 90 Furthermore,
the court emphasized that Benson's contribution was "insignificant when
measured against the full dimension of the invention."9' The court
reasoned that the crux of the invention was not on the structure of the
seat itself, but instead on the structure and function of the control
module, which operates the seat.92 Additionally, the court noted that the
patent specification mentioned the extender "only once in a twenty-
82. Seeid at981.
8 3. Id.
84. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citing Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
85. Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A. Inc., 558 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
86. See id. at 1354.
87. See id. at 1353.
88. See id
89. Id. at 1354.
90. Id. at 1357.
91. Id. at 1357-58.
92. Id. at 1358.
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column patent."93 Accordingly, the court held that Benson did not
qualify as a joint inventor as a matter of law. 94
D. Collaboration
In addition to proving joint conception among alleged inventors,
courts have required one further element: collaboration.9" Although 35
U.S.C. § 116 does not require joint inventors to physically work together
or at the same time, courts interpret the word "jointly" in the statute to
require "at least some quantum of collaboration or connection." 96
Seemingly any level of awareness on the part of each inventor that both
are working toward a common goal will suffice. The court in Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., Inc.97 explained,
"Individuals cannot be joint inventors if they are completely ignorant of
what each other has done until years after their individual independent
efforts. They cannot be totally independent of each other and be joint
inventors."98
V. REVISITING THE "FUzzY STEERING WHEEL PROBLEM"
While the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem has practical limitations,
the scenario where one inventor makes a minor contribution that is
included in at least one patent claim allows for an interesting discussion
of joint inventorship. Under the current laws defining joint inventorship,
how would the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem be analyzed? Initially,
one must define the invention-specifically, the parts of the invention that
are claimed. 99  Determining how the claimed subject matter is
distinguished from the prior ultimately governs whether a contribution is
inventive and significant, as discussed in more detail below. Let us
assume that your friend's idea of a fuzzy steering wheel is incorporated
into at least one claim; otherwise, no dispute would exist because your
friend would have failed to contribute to any claimed subject matter.
Did your friend contribute to the conception of a definite and
permanent idea? Seemingly, yes. You initially had an idea consisting of
many new and improved features for an automobile. Your friend then
contributed a specific, settled idea that may provide a particular solution
to the problem of cold steering wheels during winter season. Implicit in
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1353.
95. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
96. Id.
97. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., Inc., 973 F.2d 911
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 917.
99. See CHisuM, supra note 50.
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this analysis is the question of whether your conception of the
automobile was complete before your friend suggested the fuzzy steering
wheel. Although you may have formed a definite and permanent idea of
practically every detail of your automobile sufficiently clear to allow one
of ordinary skill to construct such vehicle, your conception did not
include "every feature of the subject matter claimed in the patent." 00 In
other words, your initial conception did not include the claimed fuzzy
steering wheel. Therefore, your friend contributed to the conception of
the invention.
A contribution worthy of inventorship status must also be inventive;
a person may not just explain well-known principles or contribute an
idea that would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art at
that time. 01  Courts have construed a non-inventive idea as being
insignificant in quality when compared to the full dimension of the
invention.102 This principle is reasonable because a non-inventive or
obvious idea fails to enhance the patentability of an invention and hence
should be designated as an insignificant contribution. For purposes of
this study, it is assumed that your friend's fuzzy steering wheel was new
and inventive.10 3 Therefore, the contribution meets the inventiveness
requirement and should not be considered insignificant at this point in
the analysis.
Recall that Nartron raises a secondary consideration regarding the
"not insignificant in quality" test. Nartron suggests that the purpose of
the invention is also important when deciding whether a contribution is
insignificant in quality when compared to the full dimension of the
invention. 10 4  Specifically, the court supported its conclusion that a
contribution regarding an extender for an automobile seat was
insignificant by noting that the crux of the invention was not the structure
of the seat itself, but instead was the structure and function of the control
module which operated the seat. 0 5 Because the inventorship analysis is
performed on a claim-by-claim basis, it was noteworthy that the single
claim in which the extender was included, claim 11, was a dependent
claim that incorporated all of the features of claims 1, 5, and 6 of the
patent. 0 6  Therefore, when examining whether the extender was
100. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
101 Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 558 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
102. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d 1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 123 F.3d at 1473).
103. Let us ignore the fact that fuzzy steering wheels already exist.
104. See Nartron Corp., 558 F.3d at 1357-58.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1358.
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insignificant in quality when compared to the full dimension of the
invention, the court compared the extender to all of the other features
incorporated in claim 11 and reasoned that the extender was
insignificant.10 7  Had the extender been an inventive contribution
featured in an independent claim with few other elements, the court
would have likely concluded that the contribution was significant. In
other words, the extender would have significantly contributed to that
claim, which is all that is required, assuming sufficient inventiveness, to
be listed as an inventor on a patent.
Applying this analysis to the fuzzy steering wheel problem, the
crucial factor is how the fuzzy steering wheel is included in the patent
claims. If included in a claim that also lists many of the other
unquestionably more important elements of the invention, an argument
could be made that the fuzzy steering wheel, much like the extender, is
insignificant in quality when compared to the full dimension of the
claim. If, however, the fuzzy steering wheel is featured in a claim with
few other elements, it may be difficult to argue that such contribution
was insignificant, especially in this scenario where it is assumed that the
fuzzy steering wheel is inventive.
Moreover, if you decide that your friend's suggestion of a fuzzy
steering wheel is significant enough to include in your patent, it should
be difficult for you to argue, after the fact, that the contribution was
insignificant. This proposition leads to a policy determination by
analyzing the two possible inequities that could result from the Fuzzy
Steering Wheel Problem. One inequity occurs if you include your
friend's suggestion of a fuzzy steering wheel in your patent, but your
friend is not considered a joint inventor. Here, you have taken and will
benefit from your friend's specific idea, but your friend will receive no
credit-and worse, no interest-in the patent. The other possible
inequity occurs if your friend is considered a joint inventor. Your friend
would gain an equal ownership interest in the entire patent for a grossly
unequal contribution. An essential factor is that you had the power to
control whether to include your friend's contribution in your patent. As
a matter of policy, because you chose to include the contribution, you
should endure the inequity.
Ultimately, the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem has no definitive
solution given the decidedly limited number of facts provided in the
scenario, but from the analysis, your friend's contribution could be
worthy of inventorship status. The contribution was included in at least
one patent claim. The contribution was to the conception of the
invention. It was inventive as stipulated and, depending upon the way it
107. See id.
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was claimed, was "not insignificant in quality" when compared to the
full dimension of the invention. Even if the fuzzy steering wheel was
buried in a claim with many other features appearing to be more
significant, you would still run the risk of a court concluding that the
contribution is worthy of inventorship status. In sum, the realistic
possibility that your friend could obtain inventorship status for such a
minor contribution is an eye-opening conclusion. This result
demonstrates the significance of understanding who contributed to each
and every element of the patent claims. Imagine a much more complex
scenario where an abundance of potential inventors among many entities
have contributed ideas, such as the joint work efforts of universities. If
one university believed that its scientists were the sole contributors to the
conception of an invention, it would be doing itself a large disservice by
not inquiring as to the source of all elements included in the patent
claims, no matter how minor a particular element may seem.
Lastly, the analysis of the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem reveals
that a proper investigation of the potential inventors of all the subject
matter planned to be included in the patent claims should influence
whether to include certain individual contributions in the claims. For
example, in the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem, you would be better off
not including your friend's suggestion in your patent claims. The
potential adverse effects on your interests due to being "at the mercy"
108
of your friend, now co-owner, strongly outweigh the benefit of including
your friend's fuzzy steering wheel contribution. While this may seem
like common sense, a party seeking a patent could never arrive at such a
cost-benefit analysis without first identifying all potential inventors of
the claimed invention. Therefore, above all, the Fuzzy Steering Wheel
Problem exposes the consequences of making incorrect assumptions as
to the sources of particular contributions to an invention, no matter how
small, and calls attention to the strategies involved in looking out for
one's best interests when seeking a patent.
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND ITS EFFECT ON INVENTORSHIP
Given that conception is the touchstone of inventorship, 09 the point
at which a person contributes an idea-for example, either during
conception, design, or testing of the invention--can have a significant
impact on the person's status as an inventor. "An inventor 'may use the
services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting his
108. Willingham v. Star Cutter Co., 555 F.2d 1340, 1344 (6th Cir. 1977).
109. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
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invention without losing his right to a patent."" 0 Therefore, suggestions
from others to help perfect an invention made during the design or
testing phase in the development of an invention usually will not rise to
the level of inventorship status.1" However, one is not barred from
becoming an inventor if one contributes an idea during the design or
testing of the invention. If a person contributes a specific, inventive idea
toward an invention during the design or testing phase and such idea is
included in at least one patent claim, then the contribution will likely add
to the conception of the invention, and the law should provide
inventorship status for that contribution.1 2 Furthermore, conception may
not be complete if testing or experimentation reveals an "uncertainty that
so undermines the specificity of the inventor's idea that it is not yet a
definite and permanent reflection of the complete invention as it will be
used in practice."ll 3  As a result, a significant contribution during
experimentation of an uncertain idea may be a contribution to conception
worthy of inventorship status.
VII. THE SUITABILITY AND CLARITY OF THE JOINT INVENTORSHIP
STANDARDS
Ideally, joint inventorship laws should encourage collaboration, be
easy to administer, be predictable in application, and promote equity.
Unfortunately, achieving all four goals simultaneously is a difficult task.
For example, prior to the 1984 amendments, the "all claims" rule was
both easy to administer and predictable in that if a person did not
contribute to every claim, that individual was not an inventor; yet, the
rule appeared to discourage collaboration because of the fear that
significant contributions could go unrewarded simply because an
inventor did not contribute to every patent claim.1 4 In the alternative,
110. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (quoting Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir.
1971)).
111. Often these suggestions will be nothing more than information that could be
obtained from those of ordinary skill in the art, which is not worthy of inventorship
status. See, e.g., Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
112. The idea behind this theory is that conception is not complete unless "only
ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive
research or experimentation." Burroughs Wellcome Co., 40 F.3d at 1228. Therefore, if
significant inputs are given that rise above the level of ordinary skill and are subsequently
included in the patent claims, then conception was not yet complete at that time, and the
contributions will give rise to inventorship status.
113. Id. at 1229 (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
114. See W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics ofJoint Inventorship: Cleaning Up
After the 1984 Amendments to 35 US.C. § 116, 5 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 153, 177-79 (1992)
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consider the effects of joint inventorship laws that foster an extremely
low bar to achieving inventorship status. This too may discourage joint
efforts because of the fear that any exchange of ideas will open the
floodgates on the path to achieving inventorship status. Accordingly,
scientists, engineers, and researchers might hesitate before seeking the
assistance of others thus decreasing productivity and hindering
innovation.
A. Has the Inventorship Bar Dropped Too Low?
Taking into consideration the conclusions drawn from the Fuzzy
Steering Wheel Problem, have the current joint inventorship rules
dropped the bar too low? At first blush, one may be inclined to say yes.
After all, the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem suggests that even the
smallest of contributions have the potential of gaining its contributor
inventorship status. Not only does this appear to discourage
collaboration, but it also seems to promote inequity. Upon further
examination, however, one should not overlook both the court-mandated
hurdles to becoming an inventor and the ability of the party seeking a
patent to exercise control over the contributions included in the patent
claims. Particularly, a contribution worthy of inventorship status must
amount to more than an exercise of ordinary skill in the art, and must be
"not insignificant in quality" when compared to the full dimension of the
invention.1 i5 Furthermore, as previously noted, "[a]n inventor 'may use
the services, ideas, and aid of others in the process of perfecting his
invention without losing his right to a patent."'' 6 These rules should
adequately eliminate many potential inventors from consideration, thus
easing the anxieties of scientists, researchers, and engineers regarding the
exchange of ideas. The current laws avoid the harshness of the "all
claims" rule, while still implementing fundamental obstacles to keep
inputs that are based upon common knowledge in the art and/or that are
insignificant from qualifying. A scientist who has a few general ideas
for a novel invention should feel comfortable collaborating with others
because any inputs he or she receives that do not meet the requirements
just noted, even if useful, will not gain its contributors inventorship
status. The scientist would most likely embrace contributions that do
meet the requirements because such inputs will enhance the value and
(discussing the "all claims rule" as a hindrance to team research efforts as well as
discussing the Congressional intent behind the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 116).
115. See discussion, supra Part IV.B, IV.C.
116. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (quoting Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir.
1971)).
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patentability of the invention. If the scientist receives an inventive
contribution of questionable significance, much like the fuzzy steering
wheel, the scientist may decide not to implement the suggestion into the
patent after weighing the benefit of the input against the cost of
potentially sharing ownership of the patent. While this is broken down
into a simple abstract example, the concept should hold true even in
complex situations as long as potential inventors are vigilant and
meticulous in noting who is contributing to an invention and
communicate with patent attorneys who can provide insight as to
whether particular inputs meet the appropriate requirements. In light of
the above analysis, the current joint inventorship standards do promote
collaboration, and despite the fact that a person may qualify as an
inventor for contributing to only one patent claim, the party seeking the
patent may manage this inequity by deciding whether to include that
contribution.
B. Practice Makes Perfect
Ease of administration and predictability steer toward the clarity of
the rules. Inevitably, the current laws, where a single patent claim can
establish an individual's status as an inventor,'"7 are less predictable in
application than a rigid rule such as the "all claims" rule. This drawback,
however, is substantially offset by the increased flexibility of the current
rules and the promotion of collaboration. The present laws are easy to
administer in that a joint inventorship analysis always requires a
thorough examination of the patent claims." 8 Moreover, the same joint
inventorship rules are applied to each claim-an inventor must
contribute to conception and the contribution must be inventive and "not
insignificant in quality" when compared to the full dimension of the
invention." 9  Once established that an individual has met these
requirements with respect to at least one patent claim, it is no longer
necessary to determine whether the particular individual also contributed
to the remaining claims. If courts continue to strictly enforce the
guidelines promulgated by the Federal Circuit, inventorship
determinations will become more predictable in the future.
117. See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 ("A co-inventor
need not make a contribution to every claim of a patent. A contribution to one claim is
enough.") (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 888
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
118. See CHIsUM, supra note 50.
119. See discussion, supra Part IV.
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C. The Importance ofDocumentation
Finally, joint inventorship disputes often arise, not due to a lack of
clarity in the rules, but because those who have contributed to an
invention fail to properly document their respective roles.12 0 When the
time comes to patent the invention, the contributors are left with their
own opinions regarding the inputs of each individual.'121 Mix in the "I
want a piece of that" or "I should receive all the credit" attitudes and the
result is a very difficult situation. Consequently, "[t]he most important
thing a university, research institution, or company can do to plan for
inventorship disputes is to document the inventive process
thoroughly." 2 2  Adequate documentation by contributors, such as
keeping detailed laboratory notebooks, should ease the administration of
the joint inventorship laws and should increase the predictability of their
application. In the end, one should keep in mind that the issue of joint
inventorship is naturally complex because it involves the cooperation of
many people with both common and individual interests. Not everyone
will agree on what constitutes the most crucial aspect(s) of an invention,
and those with much to gain are apt to pursue their inventorship statuses
all the way to court. But with continued enforcement by the courts
coupled with an increased awareness of the importance of documentation
by collaborators, the current joint inventorship rules can offer sufficient
guidance to ensure that the proper inventors are named on patents, can
effectively resolve inventorship disputes that do arise, and can encourage
joint efforts in the future.
VIII.CONCLUSION
In the past, joint inventorship was said to be one of the muddiest
concepts in patent law.123 Since then, the Federal Circuit has defined
more clearly the requirements to qualify as a joint inventor on a patent.
As the Fuzzy Steering Wheel Problem demonstrates, even a small
contribution may potentially give rise to inventorship status. Therefore,
it is crucial for those seeking patents to investigate and identify the
sources of all contributions that could potentially be included in the
patent claims. For this identification to occur, collaborators must
120. See Mark Fox Evens & Timothy J. Shea Jr., Understanding the Role of
Inventorship in IP Disputes, in NAVIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES:
LEADING LAWYERS ON PROTECTING IP ASSETS, PREVENTING AND RESOLVING DISPUTES,




123. Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F.Supp. 1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
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adequately document the inventive process. Admittedly, the boundaries
of conception in the inventive process can sometimes be difficult to
define. But by limiting inventorship to conception, the law truly
encourages innovation by ensuring that the proper inventors are being
rewarded as opposed to rewarding the free-riding inputs of those after
conception is complete. In addition to the conception limitation, the
requirements that qualifying contributions be both inventive and not
insignificant in quality when compared to the full dimension of the
invention allow scientists, researchers, and engineers to collaborate
without the fear that the floodgates to inventorship have been opened.
After all, the ultimate goal of patent law is to promote innovation,124 and
by encouraging collaboration, we do just that.
124. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
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